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In this paper, we oﬀer a dynamic model of the optimal tenure behavior of an individual who faces
the possibility of moving multiple times during his lifetime. We also investigate the lifetime eﬀects of
such factors as income tax, property tax, transaction costs, and mortgage rates on the households
tenure choice. The agents in the model utilize a genetic algorithm, a probabilistic search approach,
to determine their optimal lifetime tenure choice path. The agents are forward looking in that they
anticipate such possible events as changes in jobs, marital status, household size, or dissatisfaction
with current residence. Our results suggest several housing policy implications and explain some
of the empirical ﬁndings in the literature.
 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Several empirical studies have established that tenure choice and mobility decisions are
correlated.1 In this paper, we oﬀer a dynamic model of the optimal tenure behavior of an
individual who faces the possibility of moving multiple times during his lifetime. We also1051-1377/$ - see front matter  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jhe.2005.09.002
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1 See, for example, Boehm et al. (1991), Ioannides (1987), and Ioannides and Kan (1996).
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costs, and mortgage rates on the households tenure choice.
The decision to either own a house or rent one is by nature a discrete one. For this rea-
son, we study, the optimal tenure choice of a household as a discrete time, discrete state
Markov decision model, and analyze the eﬀects of the tenure choice on the lifelong dis-
counted utility of the individual. Discrete Markov decision models are analyzed using
the dynamic programming principle and can be represented graphically as decision trees.
The general prescribed procedure for choosing a decision from a decision tree employs
backward induction analysis. However, the empirical studies on human cognition show
that backward induction models perform poorly in predicting behavior of economic
agents (Camerer et al., 1993; Gabaix and Laibson, 2000). In this paper, we replace the
assumption of backward induction with a heuristic search procedure known as the genetic
algorithm where the agents are forward looking and anticipate such possible future events
as job relocation and changes in marital status and household size.
In addition to oﬀering a new procedure to analyze the tenure choice problem, we also
simulate the model utilizing various set of parameters obtained from historical data. We
simulate the impacts of several economic and housing variables such as income tax, prop-
erty tax, transaction costs, spread between mortgage and market interest rates, house price
appreciation rate, and relative cost of renting on a randomly moving individuals tenure
decision. The results suggest that the theoretical model and the forward looking solution
procedure perform very well in terms of explaining the previous empirical ﬁndings in the
literature about home ownership decisions of households.
The main conclusion of the model is that there is a strong relationship between home
ownership decisions and the stage in the life-cycle in that older households act diﬀerently
than middle-aged and younger households. Furthermore, the impact of changes in several
factors on tenure choice seems to be diﬀerent depending on the stage in the life-cycle. For
example, an increase in income tax rate is projected to aﬀect positively the home ownership
of all households but it has less eﬀect on old-aged households. Similarly, an increase in the
home appreciation rate increases the home ownership rate in early ages but reduces the
ownership rate of elderly. A decline in the market interest rate relative to the mortgage
interest rate will have a positive impact on the home ownership rate at early ages but it
will not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the home ownership rate of aged households. Trans-
action costs play a role in the tenure choice as well. An increase in transaction costs reduc-
es the ownership rate, and middle-aged households are more sensitive to transaction costs
than other age groups. If rents are high relative to house values, the household prefers to
own at young ages, and as rents decline, the households home ownership propensity de-
clines signiﬁcantly. We also ﬁnd a negative relationship between property tax rates and
home ownership rates regardless of age. Moreover, if the property taxes are increased,
the lifetime discounted utility of the household decreases signiﬁcantly.
Although tenure choice has been one of the most widely studied concepts in real estate
literature, the majority of theoretical models of tenure choice do not consider the impact of
the mobility of households, and hence fail to capture the intertemporal interactions between
household characteristics, mobility, and the tenure decision. Early examples of theoretical
models include Artle and Varaiya (1978), Ranney (1981) and Schwab (1982). The focus in
Artle and Varaiya (1978) and Ranney (1981) is on the impact of a perfectly anticipated
change in future house prices on current housing demand in the presence of capital imper-
fections. Households choose to own or rent based on where they are on their life-cycle path
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accumulation. The point of Schwab (1982) is to show that imperfect capital markets cause
inﬂation expectations and nominal interest rates to play a role in the demand for housing,
but not to the extend argued in some of the earlier studies. The reason is that an increase in
expected inﬂation causes an increase in the nominal interest rate and the nominal (constant)
payment on a typical mortgage, thus increasing the real payments in initial years while
reducing real payments in later years. Henderson and Ioannides (1983) highlight an exter-
nality involved in renting that makes it more attractive to own than to rent. The externality
arises from the fact that the landlord cannot fully charge the tenant for the tenants in-
creased rate of utilization of the property (this externality results in over utilization of
the property under rental tenure) and the tenant cannot collect from the landlord for
improvements he makes on a unit. However, none of these models incorporates the possi-
bility that the consumer may have to move in the future.
The need for a dynamic model of housing tenure choice is recognized in a later
paper by Henderson and Ioannides (1989). However, they conclude that such a model
would be too complicated to solve. Instead, they estimate tenure choice, consumption
level and length of stay of households using several reduced-form models. Ioannides
and Kan (1996) oﬀer a dynamic discrete choice model that incorporates mobility of
households in their tenure choice but the complexity of their setup prevents them from
providing a closed-form solution. The mobility of households is also considered in the
search model of van der Vlist et al. (2002). However, their focus is on the search of
tenants for a rental unit, the matching between searching tenants and the existing
supply of units by the landlords, and the resulting steady–state equilibrium. In a recent
eﬀort simultaneous to ours, Nichols (2003) uses a ﬁnite-horizon life-cycle model where
housing is both a consumption and investment good. His objective is to show that the
‘‘over-investment puzzle’’ of housing is consistent with the rational behavior by agents.
In addition to focusing on a diﬀerent issue, the current model also diﬀers from Nichols
(2003) in its solution methodology for the tenure choice problem. To our knowledge,
the current study is the ﬁrst study to oﬀer a dynamic life-cycle model of tenure choice
employing a genetic algorithm and to utilize this model to explain the ﬁndings of the
empirical literature. Instead of calculating the probability that the individual is an
owner or renter, we derive the optimal tenure choice strategy from the discrete choice
problem of forward looking individuals. Our approach is diﬀerent from traditional
models in the sense that individuals form their strategies by incorporating their average
probability of move, average improvement on their income, appreciation of housing
values etc. and make optimal choices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The theoretical model is presented
in the next section. Section 3 discusses the solution procedures. Numerical experiments
and results appear in Section 4. The ﬁnal section oﬀers some policy implications of our
results, especially for older households, and concludes.
2. The model
In this section, we develop a life-cycle model of household tenure choice with random
mobility. The objective of a household is to maximize the expected discounted value of his
lifetime utility. There is a positive probability that the household may have to move at any
time. If he moves, he chooses his tenure, own or rent. Let the tenure choice at time period t
S. O¨zyıldırım et al. / Journal of Housing Economics 14 (2005) 336–354 339be represented by xt and the mobility state by st where the discrete tenure choice is deﬁned
as
xt ¼
1 if household buys a house at time t;
0 if household rents a house at time t

and the mobility state is described as
st ¼
1 if household moves at time t;
0 if household does not move at time t.

Then, the maximal expected value of the discounted lifetime utility, V, is
V ¼ max
fxtgTt¼1
E
XT
t¼0
dtuðxt; stÞpðst; st1; xt1Þ
" #
; ð1Þ
where E is the expectation operator, d > 0 is the discount factor, T is the terminal peri-
od, u(xt,st) is the utility function for tenure choice of xt in state st and p(st;st1,xt1) rep-
resents the state transition probabilities in each period from state st1 with tenure xt1 to
state st.
The representation of Eq. (1) assumes that future choices are made optimally. The
part of the randomness in households payoﬀ function arises from the fact that state
variables at time t + 1 are observable only at time t + 1, but not before. There is a pos-
sibility that household moves at time t (st = 1) and the probability of a move is a func-
tion of household characteristics such as, income, age, household size, marital status,
race, and gender etc.
We assume that at time 0 an individual has a given initial endowment, x0, which is c
fraction of the value of the house h0 that he currently lives in as an owner or a renter
(x0 = ch0). If an individual moves at time 1, he has to make a tenure choice. If he decides
to own a house at time 1, he uses initial endowment as downpayment and obtains a mort-
gage to ﬁnance the rest of the house value. On the other hand, if he decides to be a renter
at time 1, he invests his initial endowment at the market interest rate, i. This decision will
be made every time he moves. Otherwise, he will stay in his current residence as either a
renter or an owner. If the household does not move at time t (st = 0), the utility function
for the renter with annual income, yt and annual rent, et, is
uðxt ¼ 0; st ¼ 0Þ ¼ ðyt þ ixtÞð1 sÞ  et
and for the owner with annual income yt:
uðxt ¼ 1; st ¼ 0Þ ¼ ðyt  hhp  RtÞð1 sÞ  ðM  RtÞ;
where s and h are the income and property tax rates, respectively. hp represents the value of
the house purchased at time p < t. Here, it is assumed that property taxes are calculated
based on the historical house value. M represents the owners constant mortgage payment
which includes interest payment, R and the repayment of the principal:
M ¼ hp  xp½ð1=rÞ  ð1=rÞð1=ð1þ rÞÞN  ;
where N is the term of the mortgage, r is the mortgage interest rate and the diﬀerence be-
tween the value of the house purchased, hp, and the existing endowment of the individual,
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2 As captured in the utility functions
above, a renter has an extra interest income, ixt whereas an owner has a tax deduction
advantage on property tax and mortgage interest payments.
A household that moves (st = 1) will incur transaction costs. These costs include attor-
ney fees, closing costs, moving expenses, etc. Thus, the utility functions for the mover can
be written as follows:
if the new unit is rented,
uðxt ¼ 0; st ¼ 1Þ ¼ ðyt þ ixtÞð1 sÞ  et  ct
and if the new unit is purchased,
uðxt ¼ 1; st ¼ 1Þ ¼ ðyt  hht  RtÞð1 sÞ  ðM  RtÞ  ot;
where ct and ot are transaction costs incurred by renter and owner, respectively.
The endowment of the household depends on the remaining mortgage balance when he
sells his house at time k 6 t and the appreciation of the house value over years
xt ¼
½ht1ð1þ atÞ  bt if xt1 ¼ 1;
hp½ð1þ apþ1Þð1þ apþ2Þ    ð1þ akÞ  bk if xt1 ¼ 0; xp ¼ 1; p < t; k 6 t;
x0 if xtj ¼ 0; j¼ 1; . . . ; t;
8><
>:
where atP 1 is the house appreciation rate and bt represents the remaining mortgage
balance at time t. bt can be expressed as a function of mortgage payments M, mortgage
interest rate r, mortgage term N, and the time passed since the individual purchased the
house, tp
bt ¼ M ½ð1=rÞ  ð1=rÞð1=ð1þ rÞÞNðtpÞ.
Clearly, if an individual has never been an owner, bt will be zero.
3
Fig. 1 depicts the decision tree of a representative household in two periods with the
respective utility functions u(xt, st; xt1, st1) in each mobility state and tenure choice.
Although we illustrate only the case where household moves and lives in an owner-occu-
pied house at time 0, our analysis will include the case where the household moves and
lives in a rental house at t = 0 as well. In the ﬁgure, rectangular boxes, and circles represent
decision nodes and states respectively. Table 1 shows how utility functions, endowments,
mortgage payments, and mortgage balances of a household are calculated at each decision
node. Because of the dynamic nature of the model, all of these functions depend on the
current and previous states and tenure.2 To simplify the problem, it is assumed that individuals take out ﬁxed rate mortgages and are not allowed to
reﬁnance. Note that if the house value is less than the endowment (ht < xt) then there will be no mortgage
payment, M = 0.
3 Note that our formulation ignores the potential inﬂuence of housing wealth accumulation. The primary
reason for not incorporating wealth accumulation in our model is that it would make the already complicated
model drastically more complicated and very diﬃcult to solve.
not move
move
not move
move
not move
move
 move
not move
t=1 t=2t=0
u(1,1;1,1)
u(1,1;1,1)
u(0,1;1,1)
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u(1,1;1,1)
u(0,1;1,1)
u(1,0;1,1)
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u(0,1;0,1)
u(0,0;0,1)
u(1,1;1,0)
u(0,1;1,0)
u(1,0;1,0)
Fig. 1. Decision tree of a representative household that lives in an owner-occupied house at t = 0.
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We present our model to predict optimal dynamic tenure choice of an individual
over his lifetime as a decision tree. The general prescribed procedure for choosing
an action from a decision tree employs backward induction analysis that entails three
fundamental consistency principles: dynamic, consequential, and strategic (Busemeyer
and Townsend, 1993; Hammond, 1976; Sarin and Wakker, 1998). Intuitively dynamic
consistency requires the decision-maker to follow through the plans to the end. Con-
sequential principle requires the decision-maker to focus solely on the future events
and ﬁnal consequences given the current state of events, and strategic consistency
is the union of the ﬁrst two. These assumptions provide the foundation for working
backward search procedures. However, recent empirical studies on human decision
making show that backward induction analysis may be unsuitable for emotionally la-
den decisions (see Busemeyer et al., 2000; Camerer et al., 1993; Gabaix and Laibson,
2000). For this reason, we assume that our households solve their tenure choice prob-
lem by looking forward. Our approach is to specify the optimal tenure path that will
be taken at each period as the household moves through the decision tree from the
Table 1
Summary of the tenure choice modela
Time Utility function u(xt, st; xt1, st1) Mortgage payment Interest
payment
Endowment Initial mortgage
balance
0 u(1,1;1,1) = (y0  hh0  R0)(1  s)  (M0  R0) M0 = (h0  x0)A(N)b R0 = b0r x0 = ch0 b0 =M0A(N)
1 u(1,1;1,1) = (y1  hh1  R1)(1  s)  (M1  R1) M1 = (h1  x1)A(N) R1 = b1r x1 = h0(1 + a1) M0A(N  1) b1 =M1A(N)
1 u(0,1;1,1) = (y1 + ix1)(1  s)  e1 — — x1 —
1 u(1,0;1,1) = (y1  hh0  R01)(1  s)  (M0  R01) M0 R01 = b01r — b01 =M0A(N  1)
2 u(1,1;1,1) = (y2  hh2  R2)(1  s)  (M2  R2) M2 = (h2  x2)A(N) R2 = b2r x2 = h1(1 + a2) M1A(N  1) b2 =M2A(N)
2 u(0,1;1,1) = (y2 + ix2)(1  s)  e2 — — x2 —
2 u(1,0;1,1) = (y2  hh1  R12)(1  s)  (M1  R12) M1 R12 = b12r — b12 =M1A(N  1)
2 uð1;1; 0;1Þ ¼ ðy2  hh2  R20 Þð1 sÞ  ðM20  R20 Þ M20 ¼ ðh2  x20 ÞAðNÞ R20 ¼ b20 r x20 = x2 b20 ¼ M20AðNÞ
2 u(0,1;0,1) = (y2 + ix1)(1  s)  e2 — — x1 —
2 u(0,0;1,0) = (y2 + ix1)(1  s)  e2 — — x1 —
2 uð1;1;1;0Þ ¼ ðy2  hh2  R200 Þð1 sÞ  ðM200  R200 Þ M200 ¼ ðh2  x200 ÞAðNÞ R200 ¼ b200 r x200 ¼ h0ð1þ a2Þð1þ a1Þ M0AðN  2Þ b200 ¼ M200AðNÞ
2 u(0,1;1,0) = (y2 + ix200 (1  s)  e2 — — x200 —
2 u(1,0;1,0) = (y2  hh0  R02)(1  s)  (M0  R02) M0 R02 = b02r — b02 =M0A(N  2)
..
. ..
. ..
. ..
. ..
.
a For illustration transaction costs are suppressed.
b A(N) represents present value of annuity of $1 per period for N periods, deﬁned as AðNÞ ¼ ½ð1r  1rð1þrÞN . Depending on the previous mobility and tenure status, we
have diﬀerent values of bs, Ms, and R in each period.
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S. O¨zyıldırım et al. / Journal of Housing Economics 14 (2005) 336–354 343initial node to terminal node. Instead of planning the action at the terminal node and
working backwards to the beginning, we propose a decision algorithm working for-
ward over time. Yet, we assume that our decision-maker is sophisticated a` la Ham-
mond (1976) anticipates future choices and chooses the best path from amongst those
that are available to him. Thus, the sophisticated choice path will be dynamically
consistent.
The empirical studies have also demonstrated that people tend to simplify problems
and solve them using selective heuristic search techniques. Since real life problems are
generally multitudinous, the trial, and error search would simply not work for com-
plex systems and that the search must be highly selective (Gabaix and Laibson,
2000; Simon et al., 1986). In this study, we use an alternative approach known as
the genetic algorithm (GA), a probabilistic search approach, to examine the optimal
tenure choices of an individual over lifetime. To derive a dynamically consistent solu-
tion for the model, we have to apply complete enumeration where GA handles eﬃ-
ciently since the search will be stochastic and directed (Goldberg, 1989). GA is
founded on the ideas of evolutionary processes and operates on a population of can-
didate solutions to a well-deﬁned problem (for a more detailed description of GA pro-
cedure, see Appendix A).
3.1. Time aggregation
In the model, we assume that individuals make buy or rent decisions whenever
they move (st = 1). The factors that cause individuals to move are characterized as
random events, such as changes in jobs, changes in marital status, changes in house-
hold size, or dissatisfaction with current residence (Muth, 1974). It should be noted,
however, that if an individual has to move and make a tenure choice at each period,
the decision tree becomes very large within a short period of time. For instance, for
our particular problem, an individual will face more than 1.5 million decision nodes if
these random events, i.e., moves, are realized 13 times over the lifetime. The tracta-
bility of such a decision tree would be very diﬃcult for an individual looking forward
at t = 0. In our numerical experiment, we assume that an individual starts to move
and makes his ﬁrst tenure choice at age 25 and lives until age 75. Then, we aggregate
our 50-year model into ﬁve mobile periods. In determining the number of moves that
a household makes over lifetime, we consider the results of previous studies on the
average number of times US households move and how long they stay in their res-
idences over their lifetime. For example, Ioannides (1987) calculates that the average
length of stay is 142.35 months. It suggests that individuals will move approximately
ﬁve times over a 50-year period. Thus, in our proposed model, the individual will
face ﬁve random events of move with estimated probabilities. Furthermore, since old-
er households stay longer in their current dwellings (Muth, 1974), we assume that a
household will decide to move or not every 5 years until age 35. The length of stay
increases to 10 years after age 35. Hence, at age 25–35, the random event of one
move happens within a ﬁve-year interval and thereafter, within a ten-year interval un-
til age 75. So, in our model, the length of stay is determined primarily by life-cycle
characteristics, such as marital status, age and occupation, that are exogeneous to ten-
ure choice. The last tenure decision will be made at age 65 and the household will
live in that residence for the remaining ten years. At age 75, the owner will liquidate
Table 2
Time dependent parameters
Age Income ($) House valuea ($) Rentb ($) Probability of move
xt1 = 1 xt1 = 0
25–30 32,649 65,000 4062.5 — —
30–35 41,078 80,000 5000.0 0.149518 0.357189
35–45 51,896 95,000 5937.5 0.128494 0.317879
45–55 63,685 125,000 7812.5 0.092154 0.242906
55–65 62,259 115,000 7187.5 0.063551 0.176615
65–75 52,736 105,000 6562.5 0.044376 0.127988
a Income and house value are the mean income and house value.
b On average, house value is 16 times of rent.
344 S. O¨zyıldırım et al. / Journal of Housing Economics 14 (2005) 336–354his house while renter has already liquidated his house and both move to a nursing
home and die at age 76.4
3.2. Parameter selection
Based on the historical data and current observations in the US markets, we utilize the
following set of parameters: property tax rate, h = 0.02; income tax rate, s = 0.19; market
interest rate, i = 0.06; mortgage interest rate, r = 0.07; house price appreciation rate,
a = 0.02; discount factor, d = 0.95; and downpayment, c = 0.2.5 Homeowners pay legal
and realtor fees at the time they move out of their homes whereas renters do not have
to pay these fees. The transaction costs for renters include security deposits of one or
two months rent, search costs to ﬁnd a new house and moving costs (DiPasquale and
Wheaton, 1996). Therefore, we assume that three percent of the house value and two
months rent can be taken as transaction costs for owners and renters, respectively.
The probability of a move p(st = 1; st1,xt1), is estimated at each decision node using a
sample of households from 1990 to 1993 panel study of income dynamics (PSID) datasets.
The moving probabilities depend on previous tenure status, household wealth, demo-
graphic characteristics, such as, age, and work status characteristics, and they decline as
households get older (see Table 2 and Table B.1 in Appendix B). Current renters have
higher probability of moving than current owners do as found in several studies (for exam-
ple, see Ioannides and Kan, 1996; Kan, 2000).
In our numerical experiments, some parameters change over time as reported in Table
2. Average household income, house value and rent at diﬀerent age groups are estimated4 Although the model does not explicitly incorporate any bequest motives, one can modify the model to assume
that individuals leave some/all of their wealth available at age 75, accumulated in their houses through principal
payments and appreciation in house value, to their heirs. This will not change the results of the paper as long as
we assume that the utility of consumption from a dollar is the same as the utility from leaving a dollar to ones
heirs.
5 These values are calculated as follows: Property tax rate is the average property tax rate in several US cities in
1992. The market interest rate is the interest rate on the 30-year US Treasury-bills. Mortgage interest rate is the
average interest rate on ﬁxed rate mortgages. House price appreciation rate is calculated from the changes in the
median house values in the US over the decade between 1990 and 2000. Most of these values are obtained from
the Statistical Abstracts of the United States. Since there is a jump in the cost of mortgage when the
downpayment is less than 20% (due to mortgage insurance requirement), we assume a loan-to-value ratio of 80%.
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but then it declines after certain age. This relationship also holds for the rent paid and
the value of the house purchased (DiPasquale and Wheaton, 1996). In calculating the aver-
age rent, we assume that households will buy a house with a value 16 times of their annual
rent. Since Poterba (1992) reports that this user cost (ratio of house value to annual rent)
increased from 13.3 to 15.1 over the last decade (1980–1990) and the real rent has not
changed much but house values have appreciated after 1990, we take a value of 16 as a
user cost in our base case.
4. Numerical experiments
The life-long optimal tenure choices of an individual using benchmark parameters and
the sensitivity analysis using six diﬀerent simulations are reported in Table 3. In the anal-
ysis of forward-looking decision-making, there are two sets of results for each experiment
depending on the initial tenure status of the household (either owner, x0 = 1 or renter,
x0 = 0 at age 25). Thus, the impact of changes in income tax, property tax, house appre-
ciation rates, transaction cost, rents, and spread between mortgage and market interest
rates on the optimal tenure path of an individual has been numerically examined. The ra-
tios in the table represent the probability of owning a house if a move occurs, conditional
on the initial tenure choice made at age 25.
According to the model, an individual who moves at age 30–35 (or t = 1) makes only
one tenure decision. In our numerical experiment, it is found that the optimal choice will
be to buy a house regardless of the previous tenure at age 25 (as captured by the ratio 1/1
in Table 3). Assuming that the ownership rate at age 25–30 is 36.5%,6 the result that all of
the movers become homeowners increases the expected home ownership rate at age 30–35
to 59.18%7 regardless of the changes in economic and policy variables.
In the second period, age 35–45, the individual faces two cases. The ﬁrst case occurs if
he does not move in the ﬁrst period, but moves in the second period and has to choose his
tenure. Similarly, the second case occurs if he moves in both the ﬁrst and the second peri-
ods. The results indicate that the household is better oﬀ by owning in one case and renting
in the other case (as captured by the ratio 1/2),8 thus giving rise the expected home own-
ership rate for the 35–45 age group to 61.87%, as reported in the third column of the table.
At ages 45, 55, and 65, a household faces with 4, 8, and 16 tenure decisions, respectively,
depending on his mobility in the current time periods. Since optimal decisions are found to
be same across diﬀerent scenarios until age 45, we will concentrate on the results after 45.
In addition to the tenure choice, we present the utility gains or losses relative to the base
case in each experiment.96 Source. US Census Bureau, Statistical Abstracts of the United States (2000).
7 The probability of home ownership at age 30–35 is the summation of three joint probabilities: p(own at 30–35,
move at 30–35, own at 25–30), p(own at 30–35, not move at 30–35, own at 25–30), and p(own at 30–35, move at
30–35, rent at 25–30). Hence, p(own at 30–35) = [(1)(0.149518)(0.365)] + [(1)(1  0.149518)(0.365)] +
[(1)(0.149518)(1  0.365)] = 0.5918. See Table 3 for further explanations.
8 There is only one exception. When the appreciation rate is zero, it is found that the owner individual at age 25
will rent a house in both cases. Their expected ownership rate is 57.63%.
9 The base case corresponds to the discounted utility of the household under the initial parameters speciﬁed in
Section 3.2.
Table 3
Numerical results
Age Income taxes (%)
16 19 22 25
p(xt = 1|st = 1,x0)
a p(own)b p(xt = 1|st = 1,x0) p(own) p(xt = 1|st = 1,x0) p(own) p(xt = 1|st = 1,x0) p(own)
25–30 1 0 36.5% 1 0 36.5% 1 0 36.5% 1 0 36.5%
30–35 1/1 1/1 59.18 1/1 1/1 59.18 1/1 1/1 59.18 1/1 1/1 59.18
35–45 1/2 1/2 61.87 1/2 1/2 61.87 1/2 1/2 61.87 1/2 1/2 61.87
45–55 0/4 0/4 56.17 0/4 0/4 56.17 2/4 1/4 61.33 4/4 1/4 64.18
55–65 0/8 0/8 52.60 4/8 3/8 57.28 8/8 3/8 63.89 8/8 8/8 70.51
65–75 9/16 6/16 53.85 10/16 4/16 57.70 9/16 11/16 65.85 9/16 13/16 72.21
Utility gain 3.87% 4.18% 3.86% 4.18% 7.70% 8.35%
House value appreciation rate (%)
0 2 3 4
p(xt = 1|st = 1,x0) p(own) p(xt = 1|st = 1,x0) p(own) p(xt = 1|st = 1,x0) p(own) p(xt = 1|st = 1,x0) p(own)
45–55 0/4 0/4 52.32 0/4 0/4 56.17 4/4 4/4 71.13 3/4 4/4 69.70
55–65 0/8 0/8 48.99 4/8 3/8 57.28 4/8 7/8 73.33 4/8 7/8 72.17
65–75 0/16 0/16 46.82 10/16 4/16 57.70 6/16 7/16 72.79 7/16 10/16 72.60
Utility gain 1.45% 0.52% 1.30% 0.56% 3.11% 1.45%
Spread between mortgage and market interest rates (ri) (%)
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
p(xt = 1|st = 1,x0) p(own) p(xt = 1|st = 1,x0) p(own) p(xt = 1|st = 1,x0) p(own) p(xt = 1|st = 1,x0) p(own)
45–55 0/4 0/4 56.17 0/4 0/4 56.17 3/4 1/4 62.79 3/4 2/4 65.07
55–65 0/8 0/8 52.60 4/8 3/8 57.28 6/8 4/8 65.05 8/8 4/8 68.16
65–75 8/16 6/16 53.70 10/16 4/16 57.70 8/16 5/16 65.00 9/16 12/16 69.89
Utility gain 0.06% 0.11% 0.04% 0.11% 0.07% 0.21%
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Table 3 (continued)
Transaction cost of owner (=c * House value) (%)
c = 3 c = 4 c = 5 c = 6
p(xt = 1|st = 1,x0) p(own) p(xt = 1|st = 1,x0) p(own) p(xt = 1|st = ) p(own) p(xt = 1|st = 1,x0) p(own)
45–55 0/4 0/4 56.17 0/4 0/4 56.17 0/4 56.17 0/4 0/4 56.17
55–65 4/8 3/8 57.28 1/8 1/8 54.01 0/8 52.60 0/8 0/8 52.60
65–75 10/16 4/16 57.70 8/16 5/16 54.65 3/16 51.84 1/16 1/16 50.79
Utility gain 0.12% 0.05% 0.23% 10% 0.35% 0.15%
Rent (=House value/d)
d = 15 d = 16 d = 17 d = 18
p(xt = 1|st = 1,x0) p(own) p(xt = 1|st = 1,x0) p(own) p(xt = 1|st = ) p(own) p(xt = 1|st = 1,x0) p(own)
45–55 3/4 2/4 65.07 0/4 0/4 56.17 1/4 57.59 0/4 0/4 56.17
55–65 8/8 8/8 71.24 4/8 3/8 57.28 0/8 53.93 0/8 0/8 52.60
65–75 10/16 13/16 73.05 10/16 4/16 57.70 4/16 53.24 1/16 1/16 50.79
Utility gain 0.11% 0.78% 0.11% % 0.22% 1.34%
Property taxes (%)
2.00 2.50 2.75 3.00
p(xt = 1|st = 1,x0) p(own) p(xt = 1|st = 1,x0) p(own) p(xt = 1|st = ) p(own) p(xt = 1|st = 1,x0) p(own)
45–55 0/4 0/4 56.17 0/4 0/4 56.17 0/4 56.17 0/4 0/4 56.17
55–65 4/8 3/8 57.28 0/8 0/8 52.60 0/8 52.60 0/8 0/8 52.60
65–75 10/16 4/16 57.70 3/16 3/16 51.84 1/16 50.79 0/16 1/16 50.64
Utility gain 0.68% 0.26% 1.02% 39% 1.36% 0.52%
a Each cell represents the probability that a household owns (xt = 1) given that he moves (st = 1) if he as an owner or a renter at age 25–30 (x0 = 1,0). For
example, in the ﬁrst column, on age 55–65 with 16% income tax rate, the household makes eight tenure de s depending on his previous moves. It is found that he
decides to rent in all of the cases (i.e., 0/8).
b The p(own) columns represent the expected ownership rate. It is calculated using the following formula n at l) = p(own at l |move at l, own at l1) p(move at
l |own at l1) p(own at l1) + p(own at at l |move at l, rent at l1) p(move at l |rent at l1) p(rent at l1) wn at at l |not move at l, own at l1) p(not move at l
|own at l1) p(own at l1) where l=30–35, 35–45, 45–55, 55–65, 65–75, and p(own at 25–30) = 36.5%.
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348 S. O¨zyıldırım et al. / Journal of Housing Economics 14 (2005) 336–354The ﬁrst experiment examines the eﬀect of income tax rate on the optimal tenure choice.
Several empirical studies have found that tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments
and property taxes have substantial positive inﬂuence on home ownership (Aaron, 1970;
Green and Vandell, 1999; Rosen, 1979; Rosen and Rosen, 1980; Rosenthal, 1988). Since
tax deductibility reduces the eﬀective cost of owning, this beneﬁt would increase with the
income tax rate. For the base case, where income tax rate is 19%, when household moves
by ages 65–75, he will have a 0.625 (i.e., 10/16) probability of owning if he started as an
owner at ages 25–30. This probability decreases to 0.25 (i.e., 4/16) if he started as a renter.
Hence, the expected home ownership rate at ages 65–75 will be 57.70%. The simulation
results suggest that if income tax rate increases, a representative household is more likely
to become a homeowner at the ages of 45–55 and 55–65. However, in old ages (after 65)
since real income of household declines (see Table 2), an increase in income tax rate will
reduce the tax beneﬁts of mortgage payments and subsequently reduce home owning pro-
pensity of moving aged households. Consequently, the tax deductibility of interest is worth
less to the older households, as in Aaron (1970). Although tax beneﬁts of owning increase,
the lifelong discounted utility of the household declines as income tax rate increases.
The simulation results for the impact of a change in house price appreciation rate sug-
gest that if there is no appreciation in house values, the household would prefer to be a
renter. If house values appreciate, he chooses to be a homeowner in early ages as found
by Nakagami and Pereria (1991) and Rosen et al. (1984). As house values continue to in-
crease, if he moves, he prefers to sell his house and rent instead of owning. This slightly
reduces the conditional probability of home ownership in old ages. Although the growth
in house prices increases the proportion of owner–occupiers for the relatively young
households (45–55), this increase will depend on the access the household has to a mort-
gage loan market. Ranney (1981) shows that consumers respond diﬀerently to changes in
prices depending on the constraints in the mortgage market. Since older households have
higher accumulation of equity than young households, they will choose to own even at low
house price appreciation rates. For example, when the house value appreciation rate is two
percent, even if the household did not own at ages 45–55, the conditional probability of
owning increases to 0.50 (0.38) (i.e., 4/8 (3/8)) at ages 55–65 and changes to 0.625 (0.25)
at ages 65–75 if the household was owner (renter) at age 25–30. Additionally, the discount-
ed utility of the household increases as the house price appreciation rate increases.
The third simulation analyzes the impact of a change in the spread between the market
and mortgage interest rates instead of the level of interest rates. Since Schwab (1982)
shows that there is no clear-cut relationship between demand for housing and real interest
rates, inﬂation rate and nominal interest rate, and Kan (2000) reports no signiﬁcant inﬂu-
ence of nominal interest rates on tenure choice, we examine the spread between the market
and mortgage interest rates instead of the level of interest rates. If the spread is low, the
opportunity cost of buying a house will be high and individuals prefer to be a renter in-
stead of owning a house when they move. As spread increases, it is observed that the
household becomes renter at ages between 45 and 55 but he is more likely to be an owner
at ages above 55. This can be explained by the diﬀerence in the cost of owning for diﬀerent
age groups. At ages 55–65, real income of household is similar to that at ages 45–55
($63,685 vs $62,259, see Table 2) but households prefer lower priced properties at ages
55–65 (the house value purchased at ages 45–55 is $125,000 vs $115,000 at ages 55–65,
see Table 2). Therefore, even though mortgage interest rates increase relative to the market
interest rate, the impact on ownership cost will be lower for the 55–65 age group than for
S. O¨zyıldırım et al. / Journal of Housing Economics 14 (2005) 336–354 349the 45–55 age group. Hence, mover households at ages 55–65 still prefer owning a house
instead of renting although households at ages 45–55 prefer to rent, as proposed by Kearl
(1979). As spread increases more, all households prefer to own and invest in a house rather
than to invest at the market interest rate and rent a house. Similar to Schwab (1982), we
also ﬁnd that discounted utility loss due to the increase in the spread is very small. As the
opportunity cost of owning increases, the expected ownership probability declines for all
age groups.
Transaction costs are assumed to be a certain percentage of the value of the house pur-
chased. Since a household in the 45–55 age group purchases the highest value houses, he
will incur the highest transaction costs. Therefore, he is better of renting than buying.
However, a household at ages between 65 and 75 is more likely to own even at slightly
higher transaction costs since he purchases a less expensive house ($105,000). In addition,
we observe that if transaction costs increase, the probability of owning decreases for all
age groups. These ﬁndings support Rosenthal (1988) that if transaction costs are high,
individuals prefer to stay in rental housing because of the increase in the cost of owning.
This result is also supported with the decline in expected home ownership rates with the
increase in transaction cost at almost all age levels. The discounted utility of the household
is slightly aﬀected from the changes in transaction costs since these costs are paid only
when the household moves.
We also found that if rents are high relative to house values (e.g., d = 15), the mover
household is more likely to become a homeowner at relatively young ages whereas if rents
decline, he prefers to be a renter immediately. However, at old ages, the household is more
likely to be a home owner although rents decline relative to house values since there are
oﬀsetting tax beneﬁts. In this experiment, the impact of changes in rents on lifelong dis-
counted utility of the renter is noticeably higher than that of the owner.
When we study the impact of property taxes, we observe that in the base case, house-
holds at ages 45–55 choose to rent when they move. This ﬁnding conﬁrms the actual lower
rate of ownership in this age group.10 As property taxes increase, the households prefer to
be renter in general. To be more speciﬁc, none of the households that moves in age groups
45–55 and 55–65 prefers to be an owner if property taxes are above two percent. The rea-
son for this behavior can be explained by the fact that property taxes are based on the
acquisition value of the house.11 Hence, the tendency to purchase high-priced houses
and higher probability of moving at ages 45–65 relative to ages 65–75 result in adverse im-
pact of property taxes on ownership propensity. Moreover, the discounted utility of the
households declines as the property taxes increase.
The numerical results suggest that income tax rate is the most important factor that af-
fect the utility of households. The sensitivity of utility to the changes in the income tax rate
can be explained by the fact that an individual is required to pay income taxes regardless
of the tenure choice or mobility. The other costs are paid either when the individual be-
comes an owner or when he moves.10 For example, in 1998, the home ownership rates were 23.9 and 19.5% for households with ages 35–44 and 45–
54, respectively. Source. US Census Bureau, Statistical Abstracts of the United States (2000).
11 This assumption might aﬀect the results because OSullivan et al. (1995) show that if property taxes are based
on acquisition value, the likelihood of home ownership among infrequent movers will increase but frequent
movers will more likely rent.
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The objective of this paper has been to oﬀer an alternative theoretical model of the life-
time tenure choice problem. In the model, the household with random mobility solves its
tenure choice problem by looking forward and maximizing its lifetime utility. We also sim-
ulate the model utilizing parameter values obtained from historical data. We examine the
impact of such variables as income tax, property tax, transaction cost, house price appre-
ciation rate, relative cost of renting, and spread between mortgage and market interest
rates on the households tenure decision. The results indicate that the theoretical model
and the forward looking solution procedure perform very well in terms of explaining
the previous empirical ﬁndings in the literature about tenure choice of households, thus
suggesting that individuals act quite rationally in their choice of home ownership status.
In this study, we have investigated the tenure choice of households under the assump-
tion that the probability of a move by a household is dependent of whether they own or
rent but independent of the length of stay in the current unit. However, as argued in a re-
cent study by Goodman (2002), the tenure choice is correlated with the length of stay in
the current unit. One extension of the current model would be to correlate the mobility
rate with the current ownership status and to incorporate residence time in the analysis
of tenure choice.
Appendix A. A simple GA algorithm
Genetic algorithm is based on the principle of evolution—survival of the ﬁttest. A pop-
ulation of potential solutions undergoes a sequence of unary (mutation type) and high or-
der (cross over) transformations. These solutions/individuals strive for survival: a selection
scheme, biased towards ﬁtter individuals, and selects the next generation. After some num-
ber of generations, the program converges and generates the optimum solution. GA is of-
ten more attractive than gradient search methods because it does not require complicated
diﬀerential equations. It needs only evaluation or ﬁtness function to distinguish between
diﬀerent solutions/individuals. For example, in most of the economic modeling, the ﬁtness
function is either utility or proﬁt function.
To clarify the search procedure used in this paper, we present a two-period version of
the problem. As illustrated in Fig. 1, since there are two move states, there would be three
tenure decisions, x during the lifetime of the household. xi takes binary values: 1 for owner
and 0 for renter. If at t = 0, household is owner, x0 = 1, thent i x s s x (s ; x , s )t1 t1 t i t t1 t1
1 1 Owner Move Move (owner,renter)
2 2 Owner Move Move (owner,renter)
2 2 Renter Move Move (owner,renter)
2 3 Owner Not-move Move (owner,renter)Since households do not make any choice if they do not move, we did not report the
not-move states. In our tenure choice model, the discounted lifelong utility function de-
tailed in Table 1 is used to measure the ﬁtness, f of the candidate solutions of the problem:
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f ¼ uðx0 ¼ 1Þ þ d½p1H1 þ ð1 p1ÞH2;
where
H1 ¼ x1½uðx1; x0 ¼ 1Þ þ d½p2H3 þ ð1 p2ÞH4;
þ ð1 x1Þ½uð1 x1; x0 ¼ 1Þ þ d½p2H5 þ ð1 p2ÞH6;
H2 ¼ uðx0 ¼ 1; not move at t ¼ 0Þ þ d½p2H7 þ ð1 p2ÞH8;
H3 ¼ x2uðx2; x1 ¼ 1Þ þ ð1 x2Þuð1 x2; x1 ¼ 1Þ;
H4 ¼ uðx1 ¼ 1; not move at t ¼ 1Þ;
H5 ¼ x2uðx2; x1 ¼ 0Þ þ ð1 x2Þuð1 x2; x1 ¼ 0Þ;
H6 ¼ uðx1 ¼ 0; not move at t ¼ 1Þ;
H7 ¼ x3uðx3; x0 ¼ 1Þ þ ð1 x3Þuð1 x3; x0 ¼ 1Þ;
H8 ¼ uðx0 ¼ 1; not move at t ¼ 1Þ
and pi denotes the probability of move at t = i, and d is the discount factor. Starting with
any random solution as an initial population, say, x1 = x2 = x3 = 0, GA guides the search
for optimum solution. Although we have a two-period problem, the recursion inherent in
the model complicates the ﬁtness function remarkably. GA works iteration by iteration
generating and testing a population of solutions. The current population are carried
through into a new population depending on the ﬁtness values or discounted lifelong utility
function. Due to this operation called reproduction, a candidate solution with better ﬁtness
value gets larger number of copies in the next iteration. This strategy emphasizes the sur-
vival-of-the-ﬁttest (natural selection) concept of the genetic algorithms. In our problem,
candidate population of solutions for three tenure choices, xi, are substituted to the ﬁtness
function and the ones with higher values are selected for further transformations.
As mentioned earlier, this approach is diﬀerent from classical search methods. In clas-
sical methods of optimization the rule is deterministic where movement is from one point
in the search space into another point based on some transition rule. However, in GAs
probabilistic operators progress the search. In order to explore new solutions in the search
space, crossover and mutation are applied as additional genetic operators to reproduction.
A simple crossover follows reproduction in a few steps. First, newly reproduced strings are
paired together at random. Then, an integer position along every pair of strings is selected
uniformly at random. Finally based on the probability of crossover, the paired strings
undergo crossing over at the integer position along the string. As an arbitrary example,
consider two strings y = 000111 and z = 111000 of length six mated at random. If the ran-
dom draw chooses position three (y = 000|111 and z = 111|000), the resulting crossover
yields two new strings, y* = 111111, and z* = 000000. By combining reproduction and
crossover, we exchange information and combine portions of good quality solutions.
Reproduction and crossover give GAs most of their search power. Third operator muta-
tion is simply an occasional random alteration of a string position based on the probability
of mutation.12 The mutation operator in general helps in avoiding the possibility of mis-
taking a local extreme for a global one. Genetic algorithms combine partial strings to form
new solutions that are possibly better than their predecessor. This kind of methodology is12 In our numerical experiments, we use publicly available GA package GENESIS (version 5.0) with default
parameters: crossover rate = 0.6 and mutation rate = 0.001.
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Holland (1975) schema theorem places the theory of genetic algorithm on rigorous footing
by calculating a bound on the growth of useful similarities. The fundamental principle of
GA is to make good use of these similarity templates.
Appendix B. Estimation of moving probabilities
In determining the moving probabilities, the model by Boehm et al. (1991) is estimated
using a sample of 9406 households selected from the 1990 to 1993 Panel Study of Income
Dynamics. The following logit model is used in the estimation of the moving probability
for owners and renters.Table B.1
Logit coeﬃcients
Variable Parameter estimate Standard error
Intercept 1.5211 0.2774
Previous tenure 1.1508 0.0617
Income 3.6699 1.0302
Family Size 0.1525 0.0205
Change in marital status 0.2562 0.0807
Married 0.1907 0.0911
Male 0.3731 0.0857
White 0.5237 0.0593
Age 9.2011 1.1025
Age squared 5.3212 1.1423
Years of education 0.0059 0.0100
Professional occupation 0.3108 0.0579
Wife employed 0.2559 0.0717
Job changed 0.7047 0.0692
Change in family size 0.5376 0.0310
Unemployed 0.1959 0.0966
Log likelihood 4636.0424Deﬁnition of Variables:
Move Dummy variable, takes a value of 1 if a household movedduring the last two years, and 0 otherwise.
Previous tenure Dummy variable, takes a value of1 if a household was owner before the move.
Income Annual family money income in terms of 1992 prices
in 10,000 s.
Family size Number of people in the family.
Change in marital status Takes a value of 1 if there is a change in marital status.
Married Takes a value of 1 for married households and 0 otherwise.
Male Takes a value of 1 if head of household is male, 0 otherwise.
White Takes a value of 1 if head of household is white, 0 otherwise.(continued on next page)Line missing
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Years of education Years of education completed by head of household.
Professional occupation Takes a value of 1 if head of household is professional,
technical, and kindred workers, managers, oﬃcials,
and proprietors, and 0 otherwise.Wife employed Takes a value of 1 for married households.
and spouse works full time, 0 otherwise.Job changed Takes a value of 1 if there is a change in the main employer
of the head of household.Change in family size The absolute value of the change in family size over
one year period following the tenure choice.Unemployed Takes a value of 1 if head of household
is unemployed, and 0 otherwise.References
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